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Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) harness the intrinsic randomness in measurement
processes: the measurement outputs are truly random given the input state is a superposition of
the eigenstates of the measurement operators. In the case of trusted devices, true randomness
could be generated from a mixed state ρ so long as the system entangled with ρ is well protected.
We propose a random number generation scheme based on measuring the quadrature fluctuations
of a single mode thermal state using an optical homodyne detector. By mixing the output of a
broadband amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) source with a single mode local oscillator (LO) at
a beam splitter and performing differential photo-detection, we can selectively detect the quadrature
fluctuation of a single mode output of the ASE source, thanks to the filtering function of the LO.
Experimentally, a quadrature variance about three orders of magnitude larger than the vacuum noise
has been observed, suggesting this scheme can tolerate much higher detector noise in comparison
with QRNGs based on measuring the vacuum noise. The high quality of this entropy source is
evidenced by the small correlation coefficients of the acquired data. A Toeplitz hashing extractor
is applied to generate unbiased random bits from the Gaussian distributed raw data, achieving an
efficiency of 5.12 bits per sample. The output of the Toeplitz extractor successfully passes all the
NIST statistical tests for random numbers. a
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 05.40.-a
Truly random numbers are required in many branches
of science and technology, from fundamental research in
quantum mechanics [1] to practical applications such as
cryptography [2]. While a pseudorandom number gener-
ator can expand a short random seed into a long train of
apparent “random” bits using deterministic algorithms,
the entropy of generated random numbers is still bounded
by the original short random seed. To generate true ran-
domness, researchers have been exploring various physi-
cal processes.
Quantum random number generation is an emerging
technology [3, 4], which can provide high-quality random
numbers with proven randomness. Different from physi-
cal random number generators exploring chaotic behav-
iors of classical systems, a quantum random number gen-
erator (QRNG) harnesses the truly probabilistic nature
of fundamental quantum processes [5, 6].
In general, the process of random number genera-
tion can be divided into two steps: the measurement
step and the randomness extraction step. In the first
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step, a well-defined measurement is performed on a well-
characterized entropy source. Ideally, in this step, the
measurement system should only detect the intrinsic
quantum noise of the entropy source. In practice, both
the source and the detection system are not perfect and
will introduce additional technical noises. In the worst
case of scenario, the technical noises could be accessible
to (or even controlled by) a malicious adversary (Eve)
and thus cannot be trusted. Furthermore, the raw output
of the detector may not be uniformly distributed. The
second step in random number generation is to perform
randomness extraction to generate uniformly distributed
random numbers uncorrelated to the untrusted technical
noises [7–14]. In practice, to conduct randomness extrac-
tion effectively, the quantum noise should be dominant
over the technical noises.
Among various QRNG implementations, schemes
based on photonic technology have drawn a lot of atten-
tion for high rates, low cost and the potential of chip-size
integration [15, 16]. Both single photon detectors and
optical homodyne detectors have been employed in pho-
tonic QRNGs. The latter is especially appealing in prac-
tice since highly efficient photo-diodes working at room
temperature can be applied. Several QRNG schemes
based on optical homodyne detection, exploring funda-
mental noises such as vacuum fluctuation [17–20] and
laser phase noise [21–25], have been studied extensively.
Remarkably, QRNG based on laser phase noise has been
employed in a recent loop-hole free Bell experiment [26].
Nevertheless, there are still practical challenges in ex-
isting schemes. In QRNG based on vacuum noise [17–20],
one major source of technical noises is the electrical noise
of the homodyne detector. We remark that building a
2high-speed homodyne detector with electrical noise sig-
nificantly below the shot noise is technically challenging
[27–29]. This may in turn limit the operating speed of
this type of QRNG. In QRNG based on laser phase noise
[21–24], fiber interferometers with large arm imbalance
(on the order of nanoseconds) are commonly employed.
To achieve high random number generation rates, either
phase stabilization of the fiber interferometer [21] or high
speed modulation of the laser source [23] is required. In
a more recent chip-size design [16], instead of using a
cumbersome fiber interferometer, the outputs from two
independent distributed feedback (DFB) lasers are mixed
at a beam splitter. Random numbers are generated by
operating one laser in gain switching (GS) mode, while
the other in continuous wave (CW) mode. Essentially,
the laser in GS mode provides a train of phase random-
ized laser pulses, while the laser in CW mode acts as a
phase reference in coherent detection. To achieve a high
interference visibility, sophisticated temperature control
is required to match and stabilize the wavelengths of the
two lasers.
In this paper, we demonstrate a random number gen-
eration scheme based on measuring quadrature fluctua-
tions of a single mode thermal state using an optical ho-
modyne detector. This scheme is implemented by beat-
ing a broadband amplified spontaneous emission (ASE)
source with a single mode local oscillator (LO) at a sym-
metric beam splitter and performing differential photo-
detection. Similar to the design in [16], our scheme does
not require a fiber interferometer of large arm imbalance,
which makes it very appealing in chip-size integration.
Furthermore, both the ASE source and the LO are op-
erated in CW mode, no active intensity modulation or
phase (and polarization) control is required.
Note even though the output of the ASE source is
broadband, the optical homodyne detector selectively de-
tects photons in the same spatial-temporal (and polariza-
tion) mode as the LO. The intrinsic “filtering” function
of the LO allows us to perform single mode measurement
without actually preparing a single mode thermal state,
which greatly simplifies the implementation. Since the
bandwidth of the ASE source is tens of nanometer, it
is very easy to align the central wavelength of the LO
within the spectral range of the ASE source.
Our scheme is different from previous studies in [30,
31], where direct detection (rather than coherent detec-
tion) is employed to measure the ASE-ASE beat noises.
Comparing with QRNG based on measuring the vac-
uum noise, our scheme can tolerate much higher detector
noises. This is because the quadrature variance of a sin-
gle mode thermal state with an average photon number
of n is 2n+1 times as large as that of vacuum noise [32].
By preparing a thermal state with a large average photon
number, we can effectively increase the quantum noise-
to-detector noise ratio.
At the first sight, it seems controversial to generate
true randomness from an incoherent source since intrinsic
randomness is deeply connected to quantum coherence
[33]. We remark that while truly quantum randomness
can only originate from a superposition (pure) state, the
input state ρ to the measurement device does not have to
be pure so long as the system entangled with ρ cannot be
accessed by Eve. One illustrative example is the QRNG
based on radioactivity, where electrons from a radioactive
source, such as 90Sr, are registered by a Geiger-Mueller
tube at random times [34, 35]. In this case, at the time
right before the measurement, the joint state of the ra-
dioactive nuclei and the electron can be described by
|ψ〉 = α|U〉n|0〉e + β|D〉n|1〉e, (1)
where |U〉n (|D〉n) represents undecayed (decayed) nu-
clei, |0〉e (|1〉e) represents 0 (1) electron emitted, and α
and β are normalization coefficients.
While the state |ψ〉 in (1) is pure, the state accessible
to the Geiger-Mueller tube (the measurement device) is a
mixed state given by ρe = α
2|0〉〈0|+ β2|1〉〈1|. To gener-
ate secure random numbers, one underlying assumption
is Eve cannot access (or control) the radioactive source
(otherwise, Eve may acquire a copy of the random bit
by measuring the quantum state of the source). The
same argument can also be applied to QRNGs based on
laser phase noise [21–24] or amplified spontaneous emis-
sion [30, 31], where the emitted photons accessible to the
detector are entangled with atoms in the light source.
In this paper, our discussion is based on this “trusted”
device scenario. Note this is different from the assump-
tions adopted in the so-called source-independent QRNG
[36, 37], where the state input to the detector could be
entangled with the environment accessible to Eve, thus
cannot be trusted.
The experimental setup is shown in Fig.1. A fiber am-
plifier (PriTel, Inc.) with vacuum state input is employed
as an incoherent broadband source. Previous studies
have shown that the ASE noise generated by a fiber am-
plifier is thermal [38, 39]. We have conducted conju-
gate homodyne detection and verified the photon statis-
tics of a single mode component (selected by the LO) of
the ASE source follows Bose-Einstein distribution [40],
as expected from a single mode thermal state. To fa-
cilitate the estimation of the photon number per mode
arrived at the optical homodyne detector and reduce the
power of unused light, a 0.8nm optical bandpass filter
centered at 1542 nm is placed after the ASE source (BP
in Fig.1). A laser source with a central wavelength of
1542 nm (Clarity-NLL-1542-HP from Wavelength Refer-
ence) is employed as the LO. Note it is not necessary
to stabilize the laser frequency, since it can never drift
out the above 0.8nm range under normal operation. To
prevent the saturation of the photodetector, an optical
attenuator is applied to reduce the LO power to about
4mW.
The outputs from the ASE source and the LO laser
beat at a 50:50 fiber beam splitter (BS in Fig.1) and the
differential interference signal is measured by a 350MHz
balanced photo-receiver (from Thorlabs, BD in Fig.1).
While the output of the ASE source is unpolarized, the
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FIG. 1: Experimental setup. ASE-amplified
spontaneous emission source; LO-local oscillator;
BP-optical bandpass filter; Att-optical attenuator;
BS-fiber beam splitter; BD-balanced photo-receiver;
ADC-analog-to-digital converter.
LO will automatically pick out the same polarization
mode as itself. No polarization control is required. The
overall efficiency η of the detection system, including
coupling losses and insertion losses of optical compo-
nents and the quantum efficiency of photodiode, has been
determined to be 0.5. An analog-to-digital converter
(ADC) is used to sample the output of the balanced re-
ceiver. All the optical components are single mode fiber
pigtailed.
The system shown in Fig.1 allows us to measure a
randomly chosen (due to random phase relation between
the LO laser and the ASE source) quadrature of a sin-
gle mode thermal state. The output is expected to be
truly random following a Gaussian distribution with a
zero mean and a variance of 2n+1 in the shot-noise unit
[32], where n is the average photon number of the ASE
source in the mode determined by the LO. To calibrate
the average photon number n, an optical power meter is
used to measure the output power P of the ASE source
after the optical filter. Using the relation of ν = c/λ, we
can determine the total mode number N corresponding
to a bandwidth of ∆λ and a time window of ∆t = 1s as
N = 2∆ν∆t =
2c∆λ
λ2
, (2)
where λ (ν) is the central wavelength (frequency) of the
filtered ASE light and c is the speed of light in vacuum.
The factor 2 is due to the two polarization modes gen-
erated by the ASE source. The effective average photon
number n (after taking into account of the detection ef-
ficiency of the optical homodyne detector) can be deter-
mined from the optical power P using
n =
ηP
Nhν
=
ηPλ3
2hc2∆λ
, (3)
where h is the Planck constant. Experimentally, P is
measured to be 29.0µW . Given η=0.5, ∆λ=0.8nm, and
λ=1542nm, the average photon number n has been de-
termined to be about 555 per mode. This suggests that
the expected quadrature variance of this source is about
three orders of magnitude larger than the vacuum noise,
which is a significant advantage of this scheme.
FIG. 2: Histogram of the measurement results and a
Gaussian fit curve. Sample size=105.
In the first experiment, a 12-bit data acquisition board
(Texas Instruments) was employed to sample the output
of the homodyne detector. The maximum sampling rate
is mainly limited by the bandwidth of the photodetec-
tor: if the sampling rate is close to or above the detector
bandwidth, adjacent samples will show significant cor-
relation. Given the detector bandwidth is 350MHz, a
sampling rate of 100MHz was chosen in our experiments.
Limited by the memory size of the data acquisition board,
105 samples were collected in this experiment. The his-
togram of the raw data together with a Gaussian fit curve
are shown in Fig.2. The raw data fits a Gaussian distri-
bution reasonably well, as expected from a single mode
thermal state. The deviation from a perfect Gaussian
distribution can be attributed to the systematic errors of
the data acquisition board, including its nonlinearity.
To further justify the Gaussian assumption, we per-
form a chi-square test for goodness of fit [41] using 1000
samples from the above raw data.1 The chi-square test
yields an α value of 0.35, indicating that there is no good
reason to reject the Gaussian hypothesis.
To determine the variance of the experimental data in
the shot-noise unit, we also measured the detector noise
(by turning off both the ASE source and the LO) and
the vacuum noise (by turning on the LO only) separately.
1 Note if the sample size is too large, the chi-square test for good-
ness of fit becomes extremely sensitive to even very small devia-
tions from the ideal distribution. In practice, such a deviation is
unavoidable due to systematic errors in the measurement system,
such as the nonlinearity of the detector and the data acquisition
board. As shown later, the random number generation rate is
determined by the min-entropy of the experimental data. So
a small deviation from the ideal Gaussian distribution will not
compromise the quality of the generated random numbers.
4FIG. 3: Histograms of detector noise and vacuum noise.
(a) Detector noise measured by turning off both the
ASE source and the LO; (b) Vacuum (and detector)
noise measured by turning on the LO only. Sample
size=32768.
The measurement results are shown in Fig.3. Comparing
Fig.2 with Fig.3, it is obvious that the quantum noise is
much larger than both the vacuum noise and the detector
noise. This allows us to apply low-cost, noisy detector to
implement our scheme. By comparing the data in Fig.3
(a) with that in Fig.3 (b), the detector noise has been
determined to be 0.62 in the shot noise limit. After be-
ing normalized to the vacuum noise, the variance of the
Gaussian random numbers shown in Fig.2 has been de-
termined to be 963 in the shot-noise unit, corresponding
to a single mode thermal state with an average photon
number of 481. Note this average photon number is about
13% smaller than the value estimated from optical power
P using (3). We suspect this discrepancy is mainly due
to the errors in determining the bandwidth of the optical
filter and the efficiency of the detector.
In the second experiment, an 8-bit oscilloscope (Agi-
lent) was used to acquire 107 samples at a sampling rate
of 100MHz. The autocorrelation of the collected data
is shown in Fig.4. The correlation coefficients for Lags
larger than zero are below 10−3 and within the range of
the statistical uncertainty due to the finite sample size.
This highlights the high quality of the entropy source.
While the above Gaussian-distributed raw data could
be useful in certain applications, uniformly distributed
random bits are more common in practice. There are
different ways to generate binary random numbers from
the Gaussian output of the homodyne detector. One sim-
ple way is to feed the Gaussian raw data into a voltage
comparator, which is essentially a 1-bit ADC. By balanc-
ing the efficiencies of the two photodiodes and choosing
a suitable threshold voltage, one random bit can be gen-
erated from each raw sample. To improve the random
number generation rate, multi-bit ADC can be employed.
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FIG. 4: Autocorrelation of raw data. Sample size=107.
In our experiment, we use the internal 8-bit ADC of
the oscilloscope to sample the output of the homodyne
detector. An 8-bit ADC converts an analog input into
one of the 256 (28) output bins. If the widths of the 256
bins have been tailored in a way so that the Gaussian
distributed analog input will result a digital output uni-
formly distributed among the 256 bins, then we could
generate 8 random bits per detection. However, since
the ADC in our experiment has equal bin size, the digi-
tal outputs (raw samples) are not uniformly distributed.
Here, we implement a Toeplitz hashing extractor [42] to
generate binary random bits from the 8-bit raw samples.
We represent the 8-bit output of the ADC as random
variable X . The maximum number of random bits that
can be extracted from each 8-bit raw sample is lower
bounded by the min-entropy of X , which is defined as
Hmin = − log2(Pmax), (4)
where Pmax = maxx∈{0,1}8Pr[X = x] quantifies the
maximal probability that X to be one of the 28 binary
sequences. Using (4), the mini-entropy of the raw data
has been determined to be Hmin = 6.4. This suggests
that in the asymptotic case, we can generate on average
6.4 random bits from each 8-bit raw sample, correspond-
ing to an efficiency of 0.8 bits per raw bit. We remark
that if the untrusted technical noise of the system makes
a significant contribution to the output, conditional min-
entropy should be employed to estimate the extractable
randomness [10].
We apply a Toeplitz-hashing extractor to generate
nearly perfect random bits from the raw data. A
Toeplitz-hashing extractor extracts a m-bit random se-
quence by multiplying a n-bit raw sequence with a n-by-
m Toeplitz matrix. The Toeplitz matrix is constructed
from a long (n+m− 1 bits) but reusable random seed.
In our implementation, we choose m = 256 and n = 400,
5TABLE I: The NIST statistical test results of 109 random bits
Results for the uniformity of P-values and the proportion of passing sequences
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 P-value Proportion Statistical test
107 99 84 102 89 100 99 116 100 104 0.632955 992/1000 Frequency
102 78 85 106 94 108 93 113 100 121 0.088762 993/1000 BlockFrequency
110 101 91 99 98 89 96 95 110 111 0.769527 994/1000 CumulativeSums
98 91 98 98 94 115 91 116 104 95 0.603841 991/1000 Runs
96 104 95 115 112 101 80 111 93 93 0.314544 990/1000 LongestRun
111 86 77 107 123 88 100 108 97 103 0.057146 991/1000 Rank
93 102 118 96 105 95 101 103 94 93 0.800005 995/1000 FFT
104 93 96 91 102 102 95 107 99 111 0.932333 982/1000 NonOverlappingTemplate
98 105 97 108 94 86 100 92 119 101 0.574903 990/1000 OverlappingTemplate
94 100 112 94 107 93 102 101 101 96 0.948298 989/1000 Universal
95 97 114 81 101 98 112 97 111 94 0.431754 995/1000 ApproximateEntropy
67 51 62 69 76 63 63 62 64 53 0.592591 619/630 RandomExcursions
53 46 65 63 52 72 67 66 57 89 0.012031 621/630 RandomExcursionsVariant
117 90 118 115 75 101 91 93 104 96 0.044797 991/1000 Serial
97 92 91 88 104 106 120 88 96 118 0.194813 986/1000 LinearComplexity
(1) The significant level α = 0.01. The first 10 columns in the table represent the distribution of
P-values. The P-value column shows the uniformity of P-values, which should be larger than 0.0001
to pass the test.
(2) The minimum pass rate for each statistical test with the exception of the random excursion
(variant) test is approximately = 980 for a sample size = 1000 binary sequences.
(3) The minimum pass rate for the random excursion (variant) test is approximately = 616 for a
sample size = 630 binary sequences.
(4) For tests with multiple test results, the worst cases are presented.
corresponding to an efficiency of 0.64 bits per raw bit (or
5.12 bits per raw sample). According to the leftover hash
lemma [43], the security parameter ε of the randomness
extractor is determined by
m = n
Hmin
8
− 2 log2(
1
ε
). (5)
Using n = 400, m = 256, and Hmin = 6.4, the se-
curity parameter can be determined to be ε = 2−32,
which means the statistical distance between the ex-
tracted random sequence and the prefect random se-
quence is bounded by ε = 2−32 [44]. To evaluate the
quality of the random bits generated from the random-
ness extractor, 1 gigabits random numbers are generated
and fed into the standard NIST statistical test suite [45].
As summarized in Table 1, our random number generator
passes all the 15 NIST tests.
Limited by the bandwidth of the detector, the sam-
pling rate used in our experiment is 100 Mega samples
per second. Combined with the hashing efficiency of
5.12 bits per raw sample, the equivalent random num-
ber generation rate is 512 Mbps. To further increase the
rate, one straightforward way is to use a detector with a
larger bandwidth. For example, using a 15GHz detector,
the sampling rate can reach 10 Giga samples per second
(GSps) [14]. The corresponding random number gener-
ation rate could be 51.2 Gbps. Of course, in practice,
a faster detector tends to have a higher electrical noise
which may reduce the quantum noise-to-electrical noise
ratio. The achievable rate has to be evaluated based
on actual characteristics of the system. One interesting
question is given noiseless detector and ADC with arbi-
trarily high precision, what is the ultimate limit of the
random number generation rate? This question has been
addressed in [7, 10]. In fact, if the detector is noiseless
and can resolve the photon number of the input state,
then instead of performing homodyne detection, we can
measure the photon number of the thermal state directly.
The photon number distribution of a thermal state is
given by [32]
P (n) =
〈n〉n
(1 + 〈n〉)1+n
, (6)
where 〈n〉 is the average photon number per sampling
time window. It is easy to see the maximum probability
is Pmax = P (0) = 1/(1+〈n〉). From (4), the min-entropy
of the source is Hmin = log2(1+〈n〉). For example, if the
output power of the thermal source is 1mw (at 1550nm)
and the sampling rate is 10 GSps, then the average pho-
ton number within the sampling window (100ps) is about
7.8 × 105. In principle, we could generate 19.6 random
bits per sample.
One appealing feature of our scheme is its simple and
robust design: both the incoherent source and the LO
are operated in the CW mode; no active modulation
6or phase (or polarization) stabilization is required. Its
compact design also opens the door to chip-size integra-
tion. In fact, a fully integrated QRNG on an InP plat-
form has been demonstrated recently, where the laser
sources, beam splitter and photodetectors are all inte-
grated on a single chip [16]. Since our scheme can be im-
plemented with similar components, we expect the inte-
gration technologies developed there can also be applied
in our scheme.
In summary, we propose and demonstrate a high qual-
ity photonic entropy source for random number genera-
tion. By mixing the output of a broadband incoherent
source with a single mode LO at a beam splitter and per-
forming differential photo-detection, the quadrature fluc-
tuations of a single mode thermal state can be explored
to generate true randomness. Experimentally, a quadra-
ture variance about three orders of magnitude larger than
the vacuum noise is observed, suggesting this scheme can
tolerate much higher technical noises in comparison with
QRNG based on measuring the vacuum noise. The high
quality of this entropy source is evidenced by the small
correlation coefficients of the acquired data. By applying
Toeplitz hashing extractor on the Gaussian distributed
raw data, unbiased random bits have been generated with
an efficiency of 5.12 bits per sample. The output of the
Toeplitz extractor successfully passes all the NIST sta-
tistical tests.
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